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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the fall of 2005, an eleventh grade student with mobility needs 
transferred to a new high school in Alaska where the parents sought 
door-to-door transportation service as part of the student’s special 
education program.1  Initially, the new school district provided the 
requested service, but in March 2006 its administrators decided to 
discontinue it.2  The parents filed a due process complaint under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),3 claiming that 
the district’s decision to eliminate those transportation services 
constituted a violation of the student’s right to a free appropriate 
public education (FAPE) to which students with disabilities are 
entitled.4   The impartial hearing officer (IHO) ruled in favor of the 
parents.5  In the IHO’s decision, he acknowledged that in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Schaffer v. Weast,6 Alaska had changed 
its state law, effective May 20, 2006, shifting the burden of proof 
(BOP)7 from the school district to the party requesting the hearing.8  
However, because the parties had presented all of the evidence prior 
to the May 20 effective date, and because the school district’s 
counsel appeared to have accepted the BOP, the IHO had placed the 
BOP on the district.9  On appeal to the federal district court, one of 
the district’s arguments for reversal was that the IHO erred in not 
placing that burden on the parents, in accordance with Schaffer, since 
                                                            
*Cathy A. Skidmore is a full-time special education hearing officer with the Office for Dispute Resolution in 
Pennsylvania.  Perry A. Zirkel is a university professor emeritus of education and law at Lehigh University.  Both authors 
previously served as review officers in Pennsylvania during the seventeen-year period that the state had a two-tier system of 
IDEA administrative adjudication. 
1 Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. N.S. ex rel. R.P., 2007 WL 8058163 at *2 (D. Alaska Nov. 8, 2007). 
2 Id. at *3. 
3 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1482 (2012). 
4 Anchorage Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 8058163 at *3.   
5 Id. at *1. 
6 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (ruling that the burden of persuasion in an impartial hearing 
under the IDEA is on the party challenging the Individualized Education Program (IEP)). 
7 The use of “BOP” here, and throughout this article, is to the burden of persuasion, as contrasted with the burden of 
production. 
8 Anchorage Sch. Dist, 2007 WL 8058163 at *5. 
9 Id. 
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they filed for the hearing.10 
This case exemplifies the importance of the Schaffer holding in 
IHO decisions under the IDEA and, consequently, potential 
appealable error in those cases that proceed to court.11  The principal 
purpose of the IDEA and its predecessor statutes was to afford full 
educational opportunity to children with disabilities12 in the form of 
FAPE.13  In providing an array of protections to children with 
disabilities and their parents,14 each of the laws contained a 
framework for dispute resolution that included administrative due 
process hearings.15  Thus, the administrative due process hearing had 
been a procedural safeguard for parents and local education agencies 
(LEAs) since the 1975 predecessor to the IDEA16—thirty years 
before Schaffer.  Prior to Schaffer, there was no generally accepted 
approach to, or basis for, assigning the BOP to one party or the other 
in IDEA cases.17   
An impartial hearing is the initial and, in many cases, the final 
adjudication for resolving the broad range of disputes under the 
                                                            
10 Id. 
11 In the illustrative case from Alaska, if the court concluded that the IHO erred in the placement of the BOP and that the 
error was prejudicial, the result could be remand or outright reversal.  In other cases, questionable treatment of the BOP might 
increase the odds of or grounds for appeal, thus defeating one of the purposes of prompt final dispute resolution.   
12 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012) (originally enacted as Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
142 § 3, 89 Stat. 773). 
13 Id. 
14 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1415 (2012).  These protections extend to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,” id. § 1415(b)(6), and 
include locating and evaluating children who may have a disability, developing an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for 
children who are eligible, and placement in the least restrictive environment that is appropriate for the child’s needs.  Id. § 
1412(a). 
15 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2012).  Additional dispute resolution processes include mediation, id. §§ 1415(b)(5), 1415(e) and 
the state-complaint resolution process. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151.  
16 The original statute was the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), which Congress has reauthorized 
and amended on several occasions.  Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400).  The 1997 statute renamed the legislation the IDEA, Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400). The current 
version of the statute, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108, 118 Stat. 2647 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S. C. § 1400), became effective in 2005.  For a comprehensive synopsis of the EHA, see, e.g., 
MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE 1:4-1:7 (2008).  For a brief summary of the various 
amendments, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Who Has the Burden of Persuasion in Impartial Hearings Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act?, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 1 (2013).     
17 See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 49. 
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IDEA.18  Based on the ample latitude provided to the states under the 
IDEA’s scheme of “cooperative federalism,”19 the state systems for 
the administrative hearing process vary widely in many respects,20 
but the IDEA provides for judicial appeal of those administrative 
decisions directly to courts.21  Despite the requirements for prompt 
resolution of these disputes at the administrative level,22 the gradual 
direction since the passage of the original version of the IDEA in 
1975 has been in the direction of increasing “judicialization,”23 
including a single tier composed of full-time administrative law 
judges (ALJs).24  This increased judicialization includes the issue of 
which party bears the BOP, more specifically the burden of 
persuasion as differentiated from the burden of production.25   
This article provides a systematic examination of the BOP in 
hearing officer decisions both before and after Schaffer.  Part II 
examines the legal basis for the BOP both before and after the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, resulting in the questions for this study.  
Part III explains the method used to collect and analyze the data, and 
                                                            
18 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2012).  These adjudications are final in many cases because most states have opted for a single 
tier administrative process, with appeals directly to state or federal court.  See infra note 20 and accompanying text.   Costs and 
other considerations likely lead many parties to forego further litigation of an IHO decision.  See Perry A. Zirkel, Judicial 
Appeals for Hearing/Review Officer Decisions under IDEA:  An Empirical Analysis, 78 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 375, 376 (2012) 
(describing process of appealing an IDEA administrative decision as “costly and ‘ponderous’” (quoting Burlington Sch. Comm. 
v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985)).    
19 See, e.g., Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52. 
20 The variations include whether the state employs a one or two-tiered process and whether the hearings are conducted 
by special education IHOs or Administrative Law Judges who also hear other types of matters.  See, e.g. Perry A. Zirkel & Gina 
Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2010).  For 
research on the longitudinal trends in the frequency and outcomes of IHO decisions, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy A. 
Skidmore, National Trends in the Frequency and Outcomes of Hearing and Review Officer Decisions Under the IDEA:  An 
Empirical Analysis, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 525, 527–40, 550–56 (2014) (providing an extensive literature review as 
well as updated findings). 
21 For judicial appeals, the IDEA provides concurrent jurisdiction for state and federal courts. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) 
(2012).   
22 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a). 
23 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping Judicialization in Special Education 
Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007).  
24 Zirkel & Scala, supra note 20, at 7.  
25 See, e.g., Thomas A. Mayes, Perry A. Zirkel & Dixie Snow Huefner, Allocating the Burden of Proof in Administrative 
and Judicial Proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 27, 35–36 (2005) (noting 
the relationship and distinctions among but distinctions between burden of proof and standard of review, as well as quantum of 
proof). 
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Part IV presents the results that answer the specific research 
questions.  Part V discusses those results and the implications of the 
findings for special education dispute resolution and provides 
recommendations for further study.  
 
II.  FRAMEWORK 
 
Neither the IDEA nor the predecessor versions of the statute 
made any provision specifying which party bore the BOP at the due 
process hearing.26  It was not until 2005 in Schaffer v. Weast27 that 
the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed this issue.  Thus, the 
framework for this study consists of two successive time periods, 
with Schaffer as the dividing line. 
During the pre-Schaffer stage, the approaches for answering this 
question varied widely based on state laws, court decisions, and—
especially in the absence of such authority—IHO interpretations.28  
These approaches included (1) placing the BOP on the district 
generally, and (2) placing the BOP on the filing party, i.e., the one 
seeking to change the status quo.29  The legal literature was replete 
with advocacy urging Congress or the Supreme Court to adopt one 
approach or another.30   
In Schaffer, the Court started its analysis by clarifying that its 
focus was the burden of persuasion and noting that the IDEA omits 
                                                            
26 For a discussion of other procedural matters that the IDEA did not address, see, e.g., Mayes et al., supra note 25, at 30 
n.8 (identifying four “unanswered ‘procedural’ questions” in the IDEA: (1) the standard of review at the second-tier 
administrative level; (2) the introduction of additional evidence on judicial review; “(3) the availability of money damages as a 
remedy for IDEA violations;” and (4) representation of parties by lay advocates). Id.     
27 Shaffer, 546 U.S. 49. 
28 For a synthesis of the various approaches at the administrative and judicial levels, by Circuit, see, e.g., Mayes et al., 
supra note 25. 
29 Id. 
30 Anne Johnson, Evening the Playing Field:  Tailoring the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at IDEA Due Process 
Hearings to Balance Children’s Rights and Schools’ Needs, 46 B. C. L. REV. 591, 613–22 (2005) (suggesting a split approach 
wherein the party challenging the program would bear the burden on substantive issues and the school district would bear the 
burden on procedural issues); Mayes, et al., supra note 25, at 45–57 (recommending that Congress place the burden on school 
districts in most cases); see, e.g., Christopher T. Leahy & Michael A. Mugmon, Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act Due Process Challenges, 29 VT.  L. REV 951, 963–72 (2005) (recommending that the Supreme 
Court place the burden on school districts due to their information advantage and specialized expertise, Congressional intent in 
the IDEA to protect children, and the affirmative obligation the IDEA places on school districts).   
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any reference to which party has this burden.31  Within this 
framework, the Court relied on “the ordinary default rule that 
plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims,”32 to hold that 
“[t]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an 
[Individualized Education Program] IEP is properly placed upon the 
party seeking relief.”33  In limiting the holding to the FAPE issue of 
the underlying case, the Court did not directly address which party 
has the BOP for other IDEA issues.34  Moreover, because it was not 
an issue in the case,35 the Court expressly declined to address 
whether a state may adopt a different approach for the burden of 
persuasion in impartial hearings, such as placing it generally on 
school districts.36  Finally, the Schaffer Court pointed out that the 
BOP issue should rarely be outcome determinative, because “very 
few cases will be in evidentiary equipoise.”37    
During the post-Schaffer stage, the pertinent legal literature has 
been much more limited in quantity and scope.38  For example, Zirkel 
canvassed state laws and lower court cases post-Schaffer, and 
recommended that Congress provide a clear and comprehensive 
resolution as to the burden of persuasion, specifically by placing this 
                                                            
31 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 62.  This holding assumes that the party seeking relief and the party challenging an IEP are necessarily the same; 
however, a school district may file a due process complaint in which it seeks relief without presenting a challenge to its IEP.  
Zirkel, supra note 16, at 5 n.27.  
34 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62. 
35 The case arose in Maryland, a state that did not have a statute or regulation governing the BOP in administrative 
proceedings under the IDEA.  Id. at 61. 
36 The Court referenced MINN. STAT. § 125A.091, subdiv. 16 (2004); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-8-9.08(8)(c)(6) (Supp. 
2004); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(e)(9) (2003); and DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 14, § 3140 (West 1999).  For a more 
comprehensive and current canvassing of pertinent state laws, see, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 16, at 6–12.   
37 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 58.  In his dissent, Justice Breyer similarly described the case of “perfect evidentiary equipoise” 
as “rara avis.”  Id. at 69 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
38 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Burns, Schaffer v. Weast: Why the Complaining Party Should Bear the Burden of Proof in an 
Administrative Hearing to Determine the Validity of an IEP under IDEA, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 567 (2006) (defending the 
Schaffer decision as harmonious with the policies of the IDEA); Luke Hertenstein, Assigning the Burden of Proof in Due 
Process Hearings: Schaffer v. Weast and the Need to Amend the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 74 MO. L. REV. 
1043 (2006) (recommending that Congress amend the IDEA to place the burden of proof on parties according to the issue 
presented, such as requiring the party opposing an evaluation or proposing a change in the program to bear the burden). 
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burden on the district except for specified circumstances.39  Although 
legal scholars have, in the abstract, disagreed as to the impact of the 
burden of persuasion on IHO decisions,40 the relevant literature lacks 
a systematic examination of IHO treatment of the burden of 
persuasion pre and post-Schaffer.   
The purpose of this article is to compare, on a national basis, a 
representative sample of IHO decisions published in the INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION LAW REPORT (IDELR)41 before and 
after Schaffer with respect to the treatment of the burden of 
persuasion. More specifically, the research questions are as follows:42 
1. Did the percentage of the cases where the IHO identified or 
applied the BOP change significantly from the pre-Schaffer to the 
post-Schaffer period?   
2. In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, (a) 
what was the specified basis pre and post-Schaffer, and (b) was there 
a significant difference in the basis between the two periods?     
3. In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, (a) 
what was the specified approach pre and post-Schaffer, and (b) was 
there a significant difference in the approach between the two 
periods?      
4. In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, was 
there a significant difference between the pre-Schaffer and post-
Schaffer cases in terms of (a) which party filed for the hearing, and 
(b) on which party the IHO assigned the BOP? 
5. In what percentage of cases where the IHO identified or applied 
the BOP was the BOP explicitly outcome determinative, both pre and 
                                                            
39 Zirkel, supra note 16, at 17.  In the meanwhile, he recommended that IHOs rely on the burden of persuasion in their 
written decisions only rarely, specifically only when the case is carefully found to be in equipoise.  Id. at 18. 
40 Compare Zirkel, supra note 16, at 18 (recommending a limitation on making BOP determinations to those few 
circumstances where such analysis is necessary), with Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 30, at 957 (characterizing the allocation of 
the BOP as critical to the outcome).  Cf. Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families under the IDEA: Collaborative in Theory, 
Adversarial in Fact, 32 NAT’L ASSN. OF ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 446 (2012) (concluding that the Schaffer decision will 
particularly impact indigent families); Terrye Conroy, Mitchell L. Yell, & Antonis Katsiyannis, Schaffer v. Weast: The Supreme 
Court on the Burden of Persuasion When Challenging IEPs, 29 J. REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC.,108 (2008) (examining the 
implications of Schaffer and suggesting that schools focus on the more important obligation of providing an appropriate 
education rather than on who bears the burden of persuasion in the hearing process).    
41 The IDELR is a specialized reporter available from LRP Publications, whose database is generally accessible through 
a subscription to SPECIAL ED CONNECTION®, http://www.specialedconnection.com (last visited December 30, 2015). 
42 In light of the overall comparison purpose of this study, the wording of each research question is in terms of pre and 
post-Schaffer.    
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post-Schaffer?   
6. Did the prevailing party outcome (based on previous article 
determination of prevailing party status) change significantly from 
the pre-Schaffer to the post-Schaffer period?  
  
III.  METHOD 
 
To evaluate the impact of Schaffer, the authors utilized the 
random sample of decisions from Zirkel and Skidmore’s 2014 
frequency and outcomes analysis,43 supplemented with cases from 
2013 obtained via the same selection procedure.  Next, given the 
retroactive effect of Schaffer, which the Court issued on November 
14, 2005, the authors eliminated the only IHO decision in the original 
Zirkel-Skidmore sample in 2005 issued after that ruling44 so as to 
have a clear partition between the pre- and post-Schaffer 
subsamples.45  As a result, the two subsamples consisted of 192 and 
65 cases, respectively. 
The coding of these cases proceeded in three steps. The first step 
was the development and refinement of the coding spreadsheet and 
protocol (i.e., coding instructions) via joint pilot testing with a small 
sampling of the cases. The second step was each author’s 
independent coding of a second sampling of the cases for the related 
purposes of finalized, fine-tuning of the protocol and obtaining 
acceptable inter-rater reliability.46  The third step was for each author 
to code approximately half of both the pre and post-Schaffer 
subsamples to complete the spreadsheet.47    
After the identifying information for each case,48 the initial 
                                                            
43 Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 20, at 540-42 and n.98 (including an explanation of the representative sample size and 
selection procedure).  That sample spanned a thirty-five year time period beginning on January 1, 1978 and concluding on 
December 31, 2012.   
44 The IHO issued this decision two days after Schaffer, and the written opinion does not indicate whether the IHO was 
aware of the Schaffer ruling.  Baltimore Cnty. Pub. Sch., 46 IDELR ¶ 57 (Md. SEA 2005).  There were no other 2005 decisions 
following Schaffer in the sample. 
45 Because the focus was IHO decisions, the authors also excluded the 112 review officer decisions in the Zirkel and 
Skidmore, supra note 20, sample. 
46 The requisite standard was a minimum of 90% agreement for each of the coded variables. 
47 A copy of the final spreadsheet, along with the protocol or coding instructions, is available from the first author upon 
request. 
48 The identifying information comprised the first three of the initial columns on the spreadsheet, which consisted of the 
IDELR citation, the year of the decision, and the jurisdiction (i.e., the state or, in one case, the District of Columbia).   
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columns of the spreadsheet consisted of entries for the filing party 
and whether the IHO directly identified or applied the BOP.49  The 
entries for the subsequent enumerated spreadsheet columns were 
limited to those cases where the IHO identified the BOP, specifically 
listing the cited support, if any;50 the BOP approach;51 the party on 
whom the IHO placed the BOP;52 and whether the BOP was clearly 
outcome determinative.53  The final two columns on the spreadsheet 
were for the case outcome54 and clarifying or supplementary 
comments.55     
The analysis of the spreadsheet entries followed the sequence of 
the aforementioned56 research questions.  For the purpose of 
determining statistical significance, the authors used the chi-square 
test with the requisite level being a minimum of .05.57   
 
IV.   RESULTS 
 
This section provides the findings for each of the six research 
questions in seriatim.  The results are based on the total sample of 
257 cases, 192 pre-Schaffer and 65 post-Schaffer.  With the exception 
                                                            
49 The search terms were “burden” and “ prove” (without the quotation marks but with the space inserted before the 
second term).  In a separate test during the pilot phase, the authors found that this combination yielded the same relevant results 
as a much more extensive set of search terms with significantly fewer false positives to eliminate.  During the collection or 
coding stage, the authors differentiated into separate columns the “identified” and “applied” variants, but at the analysis stage 
the authors conflated them based on their overlap in the data. 
50 The support, or basis, categories were: (a) state law or court decision, (b) Schaffer, (c) other federal court decisions, 
(d) miscellaneous other (specified in the spreadsheet’s comments column), or (e) unknown/not specified. 
51 The pilot phase yielded six categories of approaches, based on sufficient frequencies, of BOP placement: (a) on the 
district; (b) on the parent; (c) on the filing party, (d) on the party seeking a more restrictive placement; (e) miscellaneous other 
(specified in the Comments column); or (f) unknown.   
52 The coding categories for this variable were: (a) the district, (b) parent, (c) both parties, and (d) unknown. 
53  This category required review of the IHO’s treatment of the BOP as it related to the IHO’s ultimate conclusion.   
54 Imported from the Zirkel & Skidmore study, the case outcomes were based on prevailing party status.  For an 
explanation of this basis, see Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 20, at 547–50. 
55 Where specific to one or more of the previous entries, the letter of the applicable column(s) preceded the comment. 
56 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
57 A Chi Square is an inferential statistic, providing a criterion for determining whether a difference is of statistical 
significance or is a reflection of a mere chance occurrence.   In general, if an event would occur by chance only 5% of the time 
or less, the probability that it would occur for reasons other than chance is expressed as p < .05.  Thus, a designation of p < .001, 
as in Tables 1, 2, and 3 infra, means that the probability of an event occurring other than by chance is less than .1%.  For a more 
detailed explanation of Chi Square, see, e.g., PRISCILLA E. GREENWOOD & MIKHAIL S. NIKULIN, A GUIDE TO CHI-SQUARED 
TESTING (1996). 
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of Table 1, the results reflect the number of IHO decisions that met 
the criteria for each successive question, thereby omitting decisions 
that did not reflect the BOP.    
 
A.  Did the percentage of the cases where the IHO identified or 
applied the BOP change significantly from the pre-Schaffer to 
the post-Schaffer period?   
 
Table 1 includes all 257 IHO cases in the sample, identifying 
those that did and did not identify or apply the BOP.58  Since the 
authors could determine the answer to this question for each case in 
the sample, the two rows in Table 1 account for all 257 cases. 
 
Table 1: Chi-Square Analysis of BOP Identification/Application 
Before and After Schaffer 
 
BOP 
Identified/Applied? 
 
 
Pre-
Schaffer 
(n=192) 
 
 
Post-
Schaffer 
(n=65) 
  
Chi 
Square 
 
Yes 
 
  
60 (31%) 
 
50 
(77%) 
 
 
 
 
χ² = 
41.38**  
No 
 
 
132 (69%) 
 
15 
(23%) 
 
    ** p < .001 
Review of Table 1 shows that the IHOs identified or applied the 
BOP in less than a third of the cases before Schaffer and more than 
three quarters of the cases after Schaffer.  This was a statistically 
significant difference at a high level.    
 
   
 
                                                            
58 See supra note 49. 
 
    
Fall 2015 Shaffer’s Burden on Hearing Officer Decision Making 293 
B.  In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, (a) 
what was the specified basis pre and post-Schaffer, and (b) 
was there a significant difference in the basis between the two 
periods?     
 
Table 2 comprises only those IHO decisions where the IHO 
identified or applied the BOP.59  Thus, Table 2 is based on 110 of the 
total 257 cases.60  Moreover, the three rows in Table 2 represent 
conflated categories because of the small numbers in the sample.61  
The Miscellaneous Other row consists of cases that did not rely on 
state or federal law, such as where the basis was not specified,62 and 
where the basis was a specific section of the IDEA.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
59 The first row in Table 1 provided the number of cases included in Table 2; the authors omitted the second row in 
Table 1.  
60 Thus, the total for this table corresponds to the “Yes” row of Table 1. 
61 See supra note 50.  
62 See, e.g., Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ./Ceres Unified Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 409 (Cal. SEA 1997).  
63 See, e.g., Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. #161, 41 IDELR ¶ 172 (2007) (placing the BOP on the school district to establish that 
a child’s behavior was not a manifestation of the child’s disability, citing previous versions of the IDEA and federal 
regulations). 
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Table 2:  Chi-Square Analysis of BOP Basis Before and After 
Schaffer 
 
 
Basis for BOP 
(Where Specified) 
 
Pre-
Schaffer 
(n=60) 
 
 
Post-
Schaffer 
(n=50) 
 
Chi 
Square 
 
State Law or Court 
Decision 
 
 
11 
(18%) 
 
4 (8%) 
 
 
 
 
χ² = 
22.37** 
 
Federal Court 
Decision 
 
 
26 
(43%) 
 
43 
(86%) 
 
Miscellaneous Other 
 
 
23 
(38%) 
 
3 (6%) 
   ** p < .001 
 
Examination of Table 2 reveals that federal case law shifted from 
a plurality position (i.e., 43% of the cases that specified the BOP 
basis) before Schaffer to the predominant position (i.e., 86%) after 
Schaffer.  This shift was statistically significant at a level clearly 
exceeding the designated64 confidence level.  For the federal basis 
pre-Schaffer, the leading cited case was the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Tatro v. Texas.65  By contrast, Schaffer accounted for 42 of the 43 
cited federal court basis cases after 2005.66   
                                                            
64 See supra text accompanying note 57. 
65 Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Irving Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984).  Specifically, fourteen of the pre-Schaffer decisions, more than half of those that 
identified the BOP based on a federal court decision, cited the Fifth Circuit Tatro decision.  The next most frequently cited 
federal case for the BOP, accounting for only three cases in the sample, was Oberti v. Board of Education, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d 
Cir. 1993).   
66 For the single case not citing Schaffer, see Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch. Sys., 49 IDELR ¶ 144 (Tenn. SEA 2007) (citing 
McLaughlin v. Holt Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 320 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2003), (ruling without elaboration, that the parents bore 
the BOP).  Conversely, in the various cases citing Schaffer, one IHO placed the BOP on the parents who filed for the hearing but 
with an exception for the independent educational evaluation (IEE) claim based on the IDEA regulation for IEEs.  Chicago. City 
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C.  In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, (a) 
what was the specified approach pre and post-Schaffer, and 
(b) was there a significant difference in the approach between 
the two periods?     
  
Table 3 provides a compilation of the IHO’s party allocation of 
the BOP in the cases where, as in Table 2, the IHO identified or 
applied that standard.  The first row represents the approach of 
putting the BOP on the district in general, whereas the second row 
corresponds to the Schaffer approach of putting the BOP on the filing 
party.67 The Miscellaneous/Other category conflated other variations, 
such as placing the BOP on both parties68 or on the party seeking a 
change of placement,69 and also where the IHO did not identify the 
basis for the approach.70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Sch. Dist., 57 IDELR ¶ 29 (Ill. SEA 2011) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Murphysboro, 41 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir 1994) to support this IEE 
exception).  
 
67 Conversely, as also reflected in legal commentary, none of the IHO decisions adopted a position that placed the BOP 
on the parent generally. 
68 See, e.g., Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 35 IDELR ¶ 295 (Colo. SEA 2001) (placing the BOP, pre-Schaffer, on the 
school district to establish that the placement proposed is appropriate, while the parents bore the BOP with respect to the 
appropriateness of the IEP).  All of the cases in this subcategory predated Schaffer. 
69 See, e.g., Child with Disability, 401 IDELR 239 (Tenn. SEA 1988) (placing the BOP on the party seeking a change in 
placement).  Again, all of the cases in this subcategory predated Schaffer. 
70 See, e.g., Bentonville Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 276 (Ark. SEA 2009) (assigning the BOP to the parents, who were the 
filing party, but without citing authority or explaining the reasons for doing so).   
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Table 3: Chi-Square Analysis of BOP Approach Pre and Post-
Schaffer 
 
 
Approach  
(Where Specified) 
 
Pre-
Schaffer 
(n=60) 
 
 
Post-
Schaffer 
(n=50) 
 
Chi 
Square 
  
District Generally 
 
 
13 
(22%) 
 
3 (6%) 
 
 
 
 
χ² = 
37.93**   
  
Filing Party 
 
 
18 
(30%) 
 
44 
(88%) 
  
Miscellaneous/Other 
 
 
29 
(48%) 
 
3 (6%) 
   ** p < .001 with Yates correction71  
 
In Table 3, again based only on the decisions where the IHO 
identified or applied the BOP, there was a significant difference in 
the approach between the two time periods.  Most prominently, the 
IHO placed the BOP on the filing party in nearly 90% of cases after 
Schaffer72 compared to only 30% of cases prior to that decision.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
71 The purpose of the Yates correction is to avoid an overestimate of statistical significance with a small result, 
specifically when one cell has a count of less than five such as in the first and last post-Schaffer rows in Table 3.  See, e.g., 
Michael Haber, A Comparison of Some Continuity Corrections for the Chi-Squared Test on 2 × 2 Tables, 75 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 
510 (1980). 
72 In one notable post-Schaffer exception, the IHO placed the BOP on the district to prove that it offered FAPE without 
citation to Schaffer.  Christina Sch. Dist., 62 IDELR ¶ 97 (Del. SEA 2012).  
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D.  In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP,     
      was there a significant difference between the pre-    
      Schaffer and post-Schaffer cases in terms of (a) which  
      party filed for the hearing, and (b) which party the IHO  
      assigned the BOP? 
 
Again based on those cases where the IHO identified or applied 
the BOP, Table 4 provides a comparison between pre and post-
Schaffer for (a) the parties who filed for the hearing73 and (b) the 
party on whom the IHO assigned the BOP.  This Table separately 
summarizes the results for each of these sub-questions. 
Table 4: Chi-Square Analysis of Filing Party and BOP Party Pre 
and Post-Schaffer 
    
  
  
Pre-
Schaffer 
  
  
Post-
Schaffer 
  
Chi 
Square 
  
  
Filing 
Party 
  
 
Parent 
 
51 (88%) 
 
 
39 (81%)  
χ² =   .42 
ns 
 
 
District 
 
7 (12%) 
 
9 (19%) 
 
  
  
BOP 
Party 
 
Parent 
 
 
30 (57%) 
 
36 (73%)  
χ² = 3.17 
ns 
 
 
District 
 
23 (43%) 
 
13 (27%) 
 
 ns = not statistically significant (at the .05 level) 
Table 4 shows that for both time periods the parent was the filing 
party in more than 80 percent of the cases and the BOP party in a 
weaker majority of the cases.74  Moreover, the difference was not 
                                                            
73 For all cases in the sample, the filing party was the Parent in 86% of the pre-Schaffer cases and 81% of the post-
Schaffer cases.  This limited difference was not statistically significant, thus attributable to chance, such as measurement error.  
 
74 The total number of cases in the Filing Party rows of Table 4 does not equal 110 because, for each time period, the 
authors omitted the few cases where the filing party was unknown or both parties filed a complaint.  Similarly, the authors 
excluded the cases where the IHO placed the BOP on both parties from the BOP rows in Table 4. 
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statistically significant for either sub-question 4(a) or sub-question 
4(b). 
 
E.   In what percentage of cases where the IHO identified or 
applied the BOP was the BOP explicitly outcome 
determinative, both pre and post-Schaffer?    
 
The BOP was not explicitly outcome determinative in any of the 
cases across both time periods.  More specifically, the IHO did not 
state in any cases that the BOP was a significant reason for the 
resulting decision in light of the closeness of the case. 
 
F.  Did the prevailing party outcome (based on previous    
            article determination of prevailing party status) change    
            significantly from the pre-Schaffer to the post-Schaffer    
            period?   
 
Table 5 provides the prevailing party outcome75 for all cases in 
the sample except for the two that the authors coded as inconclusive, 
i.e., as that they only addressed preliminary adjudicative issues with 
the ultimate issues preserved for a future proceeding.76  Thus, Table 5 
is based on 255 cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
75 See Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 20, at 547-50, 555-56 (for the specific definition and determination of 
“prevailing.”). “Prevailing” in this context refers to the outcome of the case, rather than its separate rulings where the case has 
multiple issues.  The basis, by analogy, is the case law concerning attorney’s fees under the IDEA. 
76 The omitted two cases were Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR ¶ 198 (Cal. SEA 1999) (denying the school 
district’s motion for a continuance, admission of an attorney pro hac vice, and consolidations, and partially granting request for 
a subpoena for production of evidence) and Secaucus Bd. of Educ., 41 IDELR ¶ 81 (N.J. SEA 2004) (granting a parent’s motion 
to dismiss the complaint without prejudice and dismissing the school district’s counterclaim).     
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Table 5.  Chi-Square Analysis of Prevailing Party Pre and Post-
Schaffer 
 
 
Prevailing 
Party 
 
Pre-
Schaffer 
(n=190) 
 
Post-
Schaffer 
(n=65) 
 
  
Chi 
Square 
 
Parent 
  
87 
(46%) 
 
25 
(38%) 
 
 
 
   
  χ² = 
1.06 ns  
District 
 
103 
(54%) 
 
40 
(62%) 
 
       ns = not statistically significant (at the .05 level)  
 
Table 5 reveals that the outcome of the decisions based on 
prevailing party status did not change significantly from before 
Schaffer or after Schaffer.  School districts were the prevailing party 
in a moderate majority of the 255 conclusive cases for both time 
periods. The difference was due to measurement and other extrinsic, 
chance factors rather than the Schaffer ruling.  
 
V.  DISCUSSION 
 
This section summarizes and discusses the findings for each of 
the questions presented.  Additionally, the authors provide 
recommendations for future research and end by returning to the case 
in the introduction of the Article. 
 In response to the first question, the authors found that the 
percentage of cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP 
increased dramatically from 31% before Schaffer to 77% after 
Schaffer.  This finding is statistically significant but not surprising 
since the Schaffer decision was the first time the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of which party had the BOP in special education 
administrative hearings.77 Thus, increased awareness and 
                                                            
77 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62. 
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incorporation of this issue may be reasonably expected in IHO 
decisions.   However, Schaffer may not be the only reason for this 
change; the continuing trend toward judicialization of the IHO 
process, as illustrated by the gradual shift among the states toward a 
single tier of full-time ALJs, is another likely contributing factor.78   
It is also noteworthy that in nearly one-fourth of the decisions 
after Schaffer, the IHO did not identify or apply the BOP.79  It is 
more likely that the IHO opted not to mention a non-determinative 
and potentially distracting factor in the case80 rather than that the 
IHO was not aware of the new, relatively uniform Schaffer rule,81 
although this matter awaits further research.  Such empirical 
exploration may include follow-up analysis using a larger sample and 
more nuanced search terms82 as well as surveys and in-depth 
interviews with IHOs.83 
In response to the second question that compared the basis for the 
BOP where an IHO identified or applied it pre and post-Schaffer, the 
similarly significant shift from 43% to 86% in favor of reliance on 
federal case law additionally and more specifically aligns with 
Schaffer’s impact. The shift away from the Miscellaneous category 
fits with this new, major precedent, but the similar yet lesser 
reduction for the State category may only be temporary.  A variation 
to Schaffer, which the Court declined to address,84 is retention or 
adoption of a different approach via state legislation or regulations.  
All four of the cases in the post-Schaffer subsample relying on state 
law, two from Connecticut,85 one from Alaska,86 and another from 
                                                            
78 See Zirkel & Scala, supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
79 See supra Table 1 (23%). 
80 See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 16, at 18 (suggesting that IHOs reserve identifying and applying BOP for the relatively 
rare cases where the evidence is, using Schaffer’s terminology, in “equipoise.”).   
81 The qualifier of “relatively uniform,” as explained infra, refers to varying interpretations as to whether Schaffer is 
limited to IEP/FAPE cases or applies generically to the whole range of IDEA issues.  
82 The conflation here of “identify or apply” merits careful differentiation upon a more robust sample and more nuanced 
coding. 
83 Such more direct approaches extend from quantitative to qualitative research approaches. 
84 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
85 Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 143 (Conn. SEA 2013); In re Student with a Disability, 53 IDELR ¶ 67 (Conn. 
SEA 2009) (relying on CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14 (2013), placing the burden of proof in a due process hearing on the 
public agency).  This regulation pre-dated Schaffer.  
86 Anchorage School District, 54 IDELR ¶ 67 (Alaska SEA 2010) (relying on ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4 § 
52.550(i)(11) (2013), placing the burden of proof on the party requesting the hearing).  This regulation was post-Schaffer. 
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Tennessee,87 had state statutes or regulations that specified a 
procedure that either varied from or conformed to the Schaffer rule.   
In response to the third question, the shift was similarly 
significant from the District-Generally and Miscellaneous categories 
to the Filing Party approach.  This shift may be attributable to 
Schaffer, not only within its specific IEP/FAPE scope88 but also 
extending usually without any specific analysis to a wide variety of 
other issues.89  Issues in this 88% category included the 
appropriateness of a district evaluation,90 an eligibility 
determination,91 a manifestation determination,92 and a removal to an 
interim alternate educational setting.93  In contrast, prior to Schaffer, 
the filing party, or default rule, approach only accounted for 30% of 
the cases, with the other alternatives being widely varying.94  As a 
reflection of some variability in application of Schaffer in states 
without their own provisions, the IHO placed the BOP on the District 
in two parent-initiated cases in the post-Schaffer sample where the 
issue related to an IEE95 and to provision of FAPE.96  In the majority 
of sample cases where the IHO did not place the BOP on the filing 
party post-Schaffer, he or she did not specify the approach.  
However, our research focused on overall quantitative trends, not in-
depth legal analysis.  Further research is recommended to examine 
the nuanced analysis and application of the BOP.      
In response to the fourth question, for the cases where the IHO 
identified or applied the BOP, the pre-Schaffer subsample did not 
differ significantly from the post-Schaffer subsample in terms of 
                                                            
87 Metro Nashville Pub. Sch.. 51 IDELR ¶ 116 (Tenn. SEA 2008) (relying on TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1360-04-01-.02 
(2013), providing that the moving party usually bears the burden of proof in an administrative hearing).  This regulation pre-
dated Schaffer.  
88 See supra text accompanying note 33. 
89 See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 16, at 7, 12-13 (discussing whether, in states without their own BOP provisions, Schaffer 
extends to IDEA issues generally, and finding that the answer appears to be yes). 
90 See, e.g., Lancaster Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 118 (Cal. SEA 2006). 
91 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Springfield, 49 IDELR ¶ 177 (Mo. SEA 2007). 
92 See, e.g., Twp. High Sch. Dist. 54 IDELR ¶ 107 (Ill. SEA 2010).   
93 See, e.g., California Montessori Project, 56 IDELR ¶ 308 (Cal. SEA 2011). 
94 See supra Table 2. 
95 Chicago Sch. Dist. 299, 57 IDELR ¶ 29 (Ill. SEA 2011) (relying on Bd. of Educ. of Murphysboro v. ISBE, 41 F.3d 
1162 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
96 Christina Sch. Dist., 62 IDELR ¶ 97 (Del. SEA 2013) (placing BOP on school district without citation or elaboration). 
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which party filed for the hearing and to which party the IHO assigned 
the BOP.  The parents were in the majority position for filing and for 
the BOP across both periods.  The finding for the filing sub-question 
suggests that, contrary to some scholarly predictions,97 placing the 
BOP on parents does not seem to have resulted in a decline in parent-
requested due process hearings, at least proportionately.98  The same 
appears to be true for school districts.  The finding for the BOP sub-
question also seems to temper the significance of Schaffer in that the 
parties were essentially in the same obligated position before and 
after the decision.  Again, however, research that extends to more 
nuanced and direct sources of Schaffer’s impact is warranted for 
more definitive and detailed answers. 
In response to the fifth question, in both time periods, there were 
no cases where the BOP was clearly and explicitly outcome 
determinative.  One interpretation of this finding is that IHOs during 
both periods have shared the Schaffer Court’s observation that BOP 
is a “rara avis” reserved for the unusual cases that are in 
“equipoise.”99  Another interpretation, however, is that IHOs are 
identifying or applying BOP so much more often after Schaffer100 
that it is having some unknown effect on the outcome of the case, 
whether intentionally or subconsciously, by setting forth this posture 
for the decision-making.  Although the authors drew the line at 
language that expressly determined the case to be in the equipoise 
category, perhaps merely reciting the BOP—particularly in words 
suggesting not just identification but application—reflected an 
influential effect on the outcome.101  Given the limitations of this 
exploratory study, this area is another useful direction for follow-up 
research.   
Further suggesting the limited effect of BOP as a result of 
                                                            
97 See, e.g., Leahy & Mugnon, supra note 30, at 965-66 (predicting that parents of children would be discouraged from 
filing a due process complaint if assigned the BOP).  
98 See supra Table 4 and note 73.   Our analysis, however, was limited to adjudicated cases, not extending to the 
frequency of filings.  For the difference between filings and adjudications at the hearing officer level, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, 
Longitudinal Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014) (finding that the ratio of filings to 
adjudications approximately doubled for the post-Schaffer period of 2006–2007 to 2011–2012).    
99 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra Table 1 (77%). 
101 In some decisions in the sample, the IHO discussed the BOP while noting its application only when the evidence is in 
equipoise.  See, e.g., Harrisburg City Sch. Dist., 55 IDELR ¶ 149 (Pa. SEA 2010). 
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Schaffer, the finding—in response to the final question—was that the 
prevailing party outcomes moderately favored school districts both 
before and after Schaffer, with a not statistically significant, i.e., 
generalizable, difference between the two periods.  Thus, the impact 
of Schaffer appears to be negligible, with the overall outcome 
distribution remaining stable upon moving from various approaches 
to the Schafer filing-party approach for BOP, without significantly 
changing the proportion of cases in which parents or districts were 
the filing party.  A more nuanced and in-depth analysis of IHOs 
decisions, particularly using a more differentiated outcome scale for 
issue rulings as the unit of analysis,102 a corresponding analysis of 
BOP identification and application on an issue-by-issue basis, and a 
systematic examination of other related variables may reveal a more 
subtle and meaningful effect.   
In any event, the qualified overall conclusion of this empirical 
analysis is that Schaffer has not been particularly onerous on IHO 
decision-making in terms of its overt effect.  In the Alaska case 
introduced at the beginning of this article,103 the federal district court 
resolved the school district’s BOP challenge by concluding that (1) 
Schaffer “[did] not necessarily invalidate state rules,”104 which 
arguably applied in the case and which had put the burden on the 
school district, and, (2) even if in error, the IHO’s placement of the 
BOP on the district was harmless because—with due deference to the 
IHOs fact finding—the evidence for the parents was more persuasive 
than that for the district.105  This Alaska case is an illustration of a 
relatively inconsequential impact of the BOP at the IHO level on the 
outcome of a case, even upon appeal.106  The question presented in 
the title of this article merits further research and exploration.  Our 
                                                            
102 See, e.g., Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 20, at 545.  
103 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
104 Anchorage Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 8058163, at * 6.  
105 Id. 
106 For another example of such a disposition, see Bd. of Educ. of Skokie-Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Risen, 
61 IDELR ¶ 130 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (concluding, in relevant part, that the IHO’s misapplication of the BOP was harmless error in 
terms of the case outcome).  Examining IDEA court decisions regarding the BOP issue would be an additional instructive 
avenue for follow-up research.  In some cases, BOP as it applies to the IHO level arises significantly at the court level for the 
first time, i.e., even when the IHO decision was silent with regard to BOP.  See, e.g., Morgan M. v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 64 
IDELR ¶ 309 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (ruling, in relevant part, that the IHO committed reversible error for awarding compensatory 
education without finding preponderant evidence, expressed in terms of the parent meeting the BOP, for the prerequisite denial 
of FAPE). 
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results, however, suggest that Schaffer has not imposed a noticeably 
arduous burden on IHOs deciding IDEA issues. 
 
 
